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Introduction  
 
In comparative law terms, the Aboriginal title (or ‘native title’) doctrine in Australia has 
had a short and troubled history.  Since its sudden and spectacular emergence in the 
1992 Australian High Court decision of Mabo v Queensland (No2),2 the doctrine has 
provoked unprecedented social and political panic, prompted hurried enactment of vast 
and unwieldy federal legislation (and amendments to it), and is now threatening to 
settle and sink in a mire of legal technicality that many would suggest ultimately 
hinders rather than facilitates negotiated advances.  The latest significant turn in the 
journey, one that again shook loose many of the deeply-set difficulties, came in the 
recent litigation of the Noongar claim to areas in Western Australia. 
 
The controversial first instance decision in Bennell v Western Australia3 concerned one 
distinct portion of a broader ‘single Noongar application’ relating to land and waters in 
the southern part of Western Australia.  The matter specifically in issue here was what is 
termed in this article the question of ‘proof’: essentially, whether the Noongar claimants 
had been and sufficiently remained a traditionally connected community for the 
purposes of a native title claim.  Justice Wilcox at first instance answered in the 
affirmative.  The Full Federal Court in the 2008 appeal decision of Bodney v Bennell4 cast 
significant doubt across this conclusion, setting aside Wilcox J’s decision and returning 
the matter for reconsideration.   
 
The Noongar claimants were in a sense thereby returned to the start of a long and 
difficult process.  They have been asked to begin again in proving (or negotiating the 
acceptance of) their successful passage through the ‘tide of history’ – a metaphor for 
settlement-induced loss of tradition and connection that was (as will be seen) famously 
coined and controversially applied in earlier Australian decisions.  This result was 
obviously a significant blow for the Indigenous community in the south west of Western 
Australia.  And these decisions also have a broader significance.  They demonstrate, in 
the depth of their disagreement and their ultimate result, some of the abstraction and 
unresolved confusion in the Australian approach to native title. 
 
The difficulties in this field of Australian law are many and varied.  On the arguments 
advanced in this article, the central problem is the growing dominance of detail.  From 
an initial position (in Mabo (No2)) of considerable ambiguity on the exact nature of the 
native title interest and the prerequisites for its survival, an overly-particular 
(‘microscoping’) methodology has gradually crystallised (albeit not without dissent).  
This has been most obvious, and perhaps originated, in the context of native title 
                                                          
1  BA LLB(Hons) (Qld), AMusA, LLM(QUT), PhD(Dist)(W Aust), Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of 
Western Australia.  This article builds on a short note published by the author in the Australian Property Law 
Bulletin (‘One step forward and one step back: The Noongar south-west native title claim’ (2008) 23(2) APLB 14).  
For broader and more detailed analysis of the Australian developments, see Simon Young, The Trouble with 
Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change (Federation Press, NSW, 2008). 
2  (1992) 175 CLR 1.  
3 [2006] FCA 1243. 
4  [2008] FCAFC 63. 
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‘content’: Australian law has failed to coherently accommodate the possibility of 
comprehensive native title interests in the nature of ownership – instead insistently 
returning to a ‘list of traditional activities’ conceptualisation of the entitlement.5  
Correlatively, the courts have tended to approach proof with too keen a search for 
continuity in specific traditional practices, concepts and values – cultural intricacies that 
are necessarily sensitive to the bombardment of Western influence.  This microscoping 
approach is conceptually problematic, expensive and culturally intrusive.  Taken to its 
extreme, it imposes a serious historically-based confinement of native title content, and 
in the context of proof converts the logical condition of non-abandonment into a 
‘survival of lifestyle’ requirement.   
 
As will be seen, when these questions of basic methodology came squarely before the 
High Court in the 2002 decisions of Ward6 and Yorta Yorta,7 little practical guidance was 
offered (particularly on the issue of proof).  However, the quite complicated and 
restrictive theorising in these cases added new complexity to the existing uncertainty.  
The subsequent lower court jurisprudence has been somewhat directionless on these 
issues, and this was the unfortunate context for the consideration of the important 
Noongar claim in Western Australia.   
 
This article traces the development of principles relating to native title proof in 
Australian law, and then examines the recent decisions relating to the Noongar claim.  
These latest developments demonstrate the persistent confusion and troubling trends in 
Australian native title law, and provide a backdrop against which we can attempt to 
identify some potentially useful doctrinal clarifications.8   
 
 
The Australian History 
 
Inherent Indigenous rights to land were not squarely pursued in the Australian courts 
until the 1960s.  Occasional judicial comment on such matters in earlier years was terse 
and dismissive,9 no doubt largely a product of the long-dominant negative political and 
public opinion in Australia that had sustained an almost complete avoidance of the 
policy of ‘acquisition by purchase’ found elsewhere in the British territories.10  The 
courts rationalised their resistance to any recognition of Indigenous rights, in legal 
terms, by reference to the tidy precept of absolute Crown ownership and the colonial 
presumption that Australia had been ‘practically unoccupied’ at the time of settlement. 
 
When the issue of Indigenous land entitlements finally came directly before the 
Australian courts, the latent Australian position temporarily crystallised into positive 
principle.  In the Northern Territory Supreme Court decision of Milirrpum,11 Blackburn J 
                                                          
5  Cf. however the developments in Griffiths v Northern Territory [2007] FCAFC 178; yet query whether a broad reading 
of the order in this unusual case is consistent with the High Court’s intimations in Western Australia v Ward (2002) 
213 CLR 1. 
6  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1. 
7  Members of Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422. 
8  The rich body of comparative jurisprudence is referred to briefly in various places, and while detailed discussion of 
that case law is beyond the scope of this article, cross-references to fuller comparative studies are provided.  
9  See for example Attorney-General v Brown (1847) 1 Legge 312; 2 SCR (NSW) App 30 at 324-39; Cooper v Stuart (1889) 
14 App Cas 286; Williams v Attorney-General (NSW) (1913) 16 CLR 404 per Isaacs J at 439; and see generally 
Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141; Richard H Bartlett, Native Title in Australia (Butterworths, Sydney, 
2004, 2nd ed) pp 1ff. 
10  See e.g. Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 per Deane and Gaudron JJ at 105. A famous exception was 
‘Batman’s treaty’, but this action was officially interpreted as trespass on Crown lands rather than as a purchase of 
Aboriginal lands: Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 at 257.  
11  Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141. 
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delivered a lengthy and meticulously reasoned rejection of a northern Aboriginal claim.  
Hindsight reveals some significant problems in his Honour’s exposition of basic 
principle12 - most particularly in his heavy reliance on artificial juristic distinctions 
between conquest, cession and settlement;13 his reliance upon an outdated absolutist 
understanding of Crown ownership of territory;14 and his failure to distinguish  
(particularly in interpreting the comparative precedent) between the existence of ‘native 
title’ on the one hand, and its enforceability, liability to extinguishment and 
compensability on the other.15 
 
In assessing this early judgment of Blackburn J, it should be noted that in comparative 
law terms the timing of this first assertion of Indigenous land entitlements in Australia 
was unfortunate.16  Most importantly, the Milirrpum decision came just before the critical 
Calder17 decision, in which the Canadian Supreme Court reversed restrictive lower court 
decisions that had been heavily relied upon by Blackburn J in Milirrpum.18  More 
broadly, but also worthy of mention, the Milirrpum decision came prior to the resolution 
of a long-standing confusion in the New Zealand law (not dissimilar to Blackburn J’s 
own failure to differentiate between existence and extinguishment),19 and in the 
lingering aftermath of a US Supreme Court declaration that ‘Indian title’ was not 
compensable – in a case which unsurprisingly lacked the expansive and generous tone 
of the earlier and later US jurisprudence.20 
 
Despite the weight of the Milirrpum defeat—and partly because of that defeat—in the 
succeeding years the legal and political landscape in Australia changed significantly, in 
line with the growing international attention to Indigenous issues.21  Domestic reforms 
in Australia included the passage of anti-discrimination legislation and specific ‘land 
rights’ Acts, the establishment of a governmentally linked Indigenous peak body and a 
‘Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation’, and the production of major reports on the 
recognition of customary law and Aboriginal deaths in custody.  In the same era, the 
Australian High Court assumed, in addition to its traditional formalistic functions, a 
                                                          
12  Note particularly the conclusion that the doctrine of communal native title ”does not form, and never has formed, 
part of the law of any part of Australia”: at 244-5. 
13  (1971) 17 FLR 141 esp. at 202-3, 242-4, 249 (Blackburn J clung to the distinctions despite his awareness of their 
origins in misunderstanding of Indigenous societies, and despite his acknowledgement of the difficulties and 
uncertainties that had long attended their application).  For a valuable overview of the distinctions, see Lisa 
Strelein, “From Mabo to Yorta Yorta: Native Title Law in Australia” (2005) 19 Washington University Journal of 
Law and Policy 225. 
14  See particularly at 245-7, 252.  Contrast the formative cases from other jurisdictions – e.g. St Catherine’s Milling and 
Lumber Company v R (1888) 14 App Cas 46; R v Symonds (1847) NZPCC 387; Johnson v M’Intosh, 21 US 543, 8 Wheat 
543 (1823). 
15  Blackburn J also appeared to unjustifiably emphasise contextual differences in his consideration of the other 
jurisdictions (e.g. statutory provisions and the Royal Proclamation in North America – see at 231, 237-42, 251-2, 254, 
262). 
16  For detailed analysis of the comparative history from the perspective of the Australian experience, see Simon 
Young, The Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change (Federation Press, NSW, 2008), Parts I and II.  
17  Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145. 
18  See Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 at 223. 
19  This confusion emerged in the Wi Parata line of cases (esp Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZJur(NS)SC 72), 
persisted through such decisions as Re Ninety-Mile Beach [1963] NZLR 461, and only began to be clarified in Te 
Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [1986] 1 NZLR 680. 
20  Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v United States, 348 US 272, 75 S Ct 313 (1954). 
21  See generally Noel Pearson, “Eddie Mabo Human Rights Lecture”, James Cook University of North Queensland, 17 
May 1995 in John Wilson, Jane Thomson and Anthony McMahon (eds), The Australian Welfare State: Key Documents 
and Themes (Macmillan Education Australia, Melbourne, 1996) at 143; Garth Nettheim, ‘“The Consent of the 
Natives”: Mabo and Indigenous Political Rights’ (1993) 15 Sydney Law Review 223 at 224. 
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growing role in the protection of civil and cultural rights.22  Thus, the time was right for 
a re-agitation of the Indigenous lands question. 
 
In the Mabo (No 1) decision of 1988,23 a preliminary legal stoush in the watershed 
Australian litigation, the High Court identified in the federal anti-discrimination 
legislation24 a framework for the protection of native title, should it ultimately be found 
to exist.  More importantly, in Mabo (No 2)25 a majority of the court determined that the 
common law of Australia does recognise a form of native title, thereby unpicking the old 
adherence to the notion of absolute Crown ownership and the accompanying 
understanding that Australia was ‘practically unoccupied’ at the time of colonisation.26 
The court held that upon the acquisition of sovereignty the Crown acquired a radical 
title over the relevant territory, with native title surviving as a burden upon that radical 
title.27  
 
The Mabo (No2) decision is regarded by many as the most significant case in Australian 
legal history.  This was the sudden and very late arrival of a doctrine that re-shaped 
significant tenets of both public and private law in this country.  Australia’s legal and 
political ill-preparedness, together with a specific concern over the effect of existing anti-
discrimination legislation upon government activities that may have infringed native 
title, provoked immediate and intensive negotiation, and ultimately a comprehensive 
federal legislative response.28  The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) provided for the validation 
of government activities that might be challenged under the anti-discrimination 
legislation, established an intricate claims mediation and determination process, and 
laid down a regime for the regulation of future acts that might affect Aboriginal 
interests.  
 
In the years immediately following the Mabo (No2) decision and the enactment of the 
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), the High Court’s attention was directed to politically pressing 
questions of extinguishment and the interrelationship of Indigenous and non-
Indigenous rights, namely: the precise effect of pastoral leases,29 freehold grants30 and 
statutory vesting provisions31 on native title; and the legitimacy of offshore claims and 
                                                          
22  See e.g. Onus v Alcoa of Australia Ltd (1981) 149 CLR 27; R v Toohey; Ex parte Northern Land Council (1981) 151 CLR 
170; Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168; Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1; Gerhardy v Brown 
(1985) 159 CLR 70; Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550; Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79; Street v Queensland Bar 
Association (1989) 168 CLR 461. And see in 1992 (the year of the Mabo (No 2) decision itself): Nationwide News Pty Ltd 
v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1; Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (No 2) (1992) 177 CLR 106; Chu Kheng 
Lim v Minister for Immigration Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1; Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292. 
23  Mabo v Queensland (1988) 166 CLR 186. 
24  Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). 
25  Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
26  See Brennan J (with whom Mason CJ and McHugh J agreed) at 29-54, 57-8, 63, Deane and Gaudron JJ at 102-9, 
Toohey J at 181-2, 184.  For readers well-versed in old imperial and common law principle, the Court considered 
that the actual acquisition of sovereignty over Australia could not be challenged and the ‘settled’ classification of 
Australia (contrast ‘conquered’ or ‘ceded’) was not disturbed – the adjustment of legal principle came in respect of 
the precise effect of this legal history and colonial characterisation on Aboriginal land entitlements.  See Brennan J 
at 26, 31-3, 37-9, Deane and Gaudron JJ at 77-8, 80-2, 95, 102, Toohey J at 180, 182, 183, 206, see also Dawson J at 121, 
138-9.  Brennan J’s explanation was that “[the] preferable rule equates the Indigenous inhabitants of a settled colony 
with the inhabitants of a conquered colony in respect of their rights and interests in land” (at 57, emphasis added).  
27  See e.g. Brennan J at 43-4, 48, 57, Deane and Gaudron JJ at 81, 86, 99, 100, 109, 110, 116, Toohey J at 180, 182.  The 
majority rejected the line of precedent that suggested some governmental act of recognition was needed for such 
Aboriginal interests to be enforceable: see e.g. Brennan J at 55-7, Toohey J at 183-4.  
28  See generally the discussion in Garth Nettheim, ‘“The Consent of the Natives”: Mabo and Indigenous Political 
Rights’ (1993) 15 Sydney Law Review 223 at 226-7. 
29  Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1. 
30  Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96. 
31  Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351. 
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their potential interaction with established non-Indigenous common law rights.32   This 
High Court development of basic principle was interspersed with incremental judicial 
exploration of the federal Act,33 the enactment of complementary State and Territory 
legislation (as contemplated by the federal regime),34 and controversial amendment of 
the federal Act itself – most notably in 1998 via further validation of government 
activities, some codification of the effect of past government dealings, and a re-balancing 
of respective interests under the future act regime. 
  
Despite the controversy surrounding these developments, the notion of post-colonial 
legal co-existence was not spectacularly new.35  Australia’s closest legal neighbours, of 
course, have a long history of acknowledgement and exploration of Indigenous land 
entitlements, with reported judicial recognition dating back to at least 1823 in the US,36 
1847 in New Zealand37 and 1888 in Canada.38  Viewed in this broader comparative con-
text, the controversial turn taken in Mabo (No 2) was in fact a ‘relatively modest 
development’, one that brought Australia ‘cautiously into line’ with the other 
jurisdictions.39  
 
 
Native Title Proof: Mabo to Yorta Yorta 
 
Prior to its immersion in complicated questions of extinguishment from the mid-1990s, 
the High Court did in its original formulation of principle lay down some basic 
propositions about the nature of native title and the prerequisites for its survival (the 
two are often loosely termed ‘content’ and ‘proof’).  The latter issue is the critical one for 
the purposes of this article.  The leading and most enduring judgment from the Mabo 
(No2) decision was that of Brennan J.40  Certain popular passages from that judgment 
laid the foundations for the contemporary Australian approach.   
 
In the course of confirming the fundamental point that a mere change in sovereignty 
does not extinguish native title to land, Brennan J noted: 
[The] term “native title” conveniently describes the interests and rights of Indigenous inhabitants in 
land, whether communal, group or individual, possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged 
by and the traditional customs observed by the Indigenous inhabitants. 41  
  
And later, in considering to the ‘nature and incidents’ of native title, his Honour used 
similar terminology:  
                                                          
32  Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113. 
33  Both incidentally in the High Court cases (see e.g. Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351 and Commonwealth v Yarmirr 
(2001) 184 ALR 113) and in numerous lower court decisions. 
34  See e.g. Native Title (New South Wales) Act 1994 (NSW); Native Title (Queensland) Act 1993 (Qld); Native Title (State 
Provisions) Act 1999 (WA); Land Titles Validation Act 1994 (Vic). 
35  See e.g. Justice Robert French, paper delivered at Wik – National Conference on the High Court’s Judgment – The Way 
Forward (7 Feb 1997, Brisbane, Qld) at 66. 
36  Johnson v M’Intosh, 21 US 543, 8 Wheat 543 (1823). 
37  R v Symonds (1847) NZPCC 387. 
38  St Catharines Milling and Lumber Company v R (1887) 13 SCR 577; St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v R 
(1888) 14 App Cas 46. 
39  Garth Nettheim, ‘The International Context for Native Title’ (November 1993) Impact 14 at 15; cf. Garth Nettheim, 
‘“The Consent of the Natives”: Mabo and Indigenous Political Rights’ (1993) 15 Sydney Law Review 223 at 224 at 
225. 
40  Mason CJ and McHugh J agreed with the judgment of Brennan J (at 15). Separate judgments were delivered by 
Deane and Gaudron JJ (jointly) and by Toohey J, and Dawson J dissented.  
41  Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 at 57.  
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Native title has its origin in and is given its content by the traditional laws acknowledged by and the 
traditional customs observed by the Indigenous inhabitants of a territory. The nature and incidents 
of native title must be ascertained as a matter of fact by reference to those laws and customs. The 
ascertainment may present a problem of considerable difficulty … 42 
  
Then, in the course of a detailed discussion of the general inalienability of native title 
interests, his Honour said: 
Where a clan or group has continued to acknowledge the laws and (so far as practicable) to observe 
the customs based on the traditions of that clan or group, whereby their traditional connexion with 
the land has been substantially maintained, the traditional community title of that clan or group can 
be said to remain in existence. The common law can, by reference to the traditional laws and customs 
of an Indigenous people, identify and protect the native rights and interests to which they give rise. 
However, when the tide of history has washed away any real acknowledgment of traditional law and 
any real observance of traditional customs, the foundation of native title has disappeared. A native 
title which has ceased with the abandoning of laws and customs based on tradition cannot be revived 
for contemporary recognition. Australian law can protect the interests of members of an Indigenous 
clan or group, whether communally or individually, only in conformity with the traditional laws and 
customs of the people to whom the clan or group belongs and only where members of the clan or 
group acknowledge those laws and observe those customs (so far as it is practicable to do so).43  
  
Brennan J ultimately returned to these notions again in a tightly-constructed and often-
quoted summary: 
6. Native title to particular land (whether classified by the common law as proprietary, usufructuary 
or otherwise), its incidents and the persons entitled thereto are ascertained according to the laws and 
customs of the Indigenous people who, by those laws and customs, have a connection with the land. 
It is immaterial that the laws and customs have undergone some change since the Crown acquired 
sovereignty provided the general nature of the connection between the Indigenous people and the 
land remains … 
7. Native title to an area of land which a clan or group is entitled to enjoy under the laws and 
customs of an Indigenous people is extinguished if the clan or group, by ceasing to acknowledge 
those laws, and (so far as practicable) observe those customs, loses its connection with the land or on 
the death of the last of the members of the group or clan. 
8. Native title over any parcel of land can be surrendered to the Crown voluntarily by all those clans 
or groups who, by the traditional laws and customs of the Indigenous people, have a relevant 
connection with the land but the rights and privileges conferred by native title are otherwise inalien-
able to persons who are not members of the Indigenous people to whom alienation is permitted by 
the traditional laws and customs. 44 
  
There is a conspicuous emphasis in these passages on the survival of ‘traditional laws 
and customs’ and traditional ‘connection’.  However, on close examination his Honour’s 
exact meaning (and the meaning of the decision as a whole in this respect) was unclear.  
How close and specific is the examination of ‘tradition’?  How much and what type of 
change and interruption is accommodated?  Drawing from the decision a strict 
requirement of constancy and continuity in very specific laws and customs would be 
inconsistent with the actual result in the case (the recognition of subsisting title in the 
hands of a historically affiliated, strongly land-connected but quite adapted community).  
And an exacting requirement of this type was in fact explicitly rejected by Toohey J45 
and doubted by Deane and Gaudron JJ.46  A strict requirement might arguably be 
                                                          
42  At 58. 
43  At 59-60. 
44  At 70. 
45  At 192. 
46  At 110. 
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attributed to the popular passages quoted above from the judgment of Brennan J, but his 
Honour’s approach was ambiguous given the ameliorating terminology employed in 
many places (e.g. the references to practicability), the shifting emphasis in his various 
statements of the relevant principles, and his failure to attempt any concerted 
application of a strict requirement to the facts.  It must also be remembered that the 
Mabo claim, relating to small remote islands in the Torres Strait north of the Australian 
mainland, was in many respects atypical.  How should this requirement of maintenance 
of tradition be applied on the mainland, where the history of cross-cultural interaction 
and indeed the pattern of Indigenous land use are markedly different? 
 
For all its complicated twists and turns, the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), enacted in the 
aftermath of the Mabo (No2) decision, offered little guidance on these difficult questions.  
Section 223 contains a statutory definition of ‘native title’: 
223(1) The expression native title or native title rights and interests means the communal, group or 
individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or 
waters, where:  
(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, and the 
traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; and  
(b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, have a 
connection with the land or waters; and  
(c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia. 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), ‘rights and interests’ in that section includes hunting, gathering, 
or fishing, rights and interests. 47 
        
This centrally relevant provision, brief in its terms, obviously adopts terminology from 
Brennan J’s judgment without addressing the uncertainty identified above.  And the 
succeeding High Court cases, for some time focussed on issues of extinguishment,48 did 
little to clarify the basic matters of the exact nature of native title and the prerequisites 
for its survival.  Nevertheless, it must be noted that there was during this period some 
undiscerning perpetuation of an exacting ‘tradition’-focused approach, which emerged 
from persistently selective references to passages from Mabo (No 2), the priorities and 
strategies of the parties, and the manner in which issues were coming before the courts.49     
 
The attention of the High Court finally turned back to the fundamental questions of 
proof and content in 2002.  Two critically important and mutually reinforcing decisions 
were handed down in that year.  The decision in Ward50 concerned a substantial claim to 
lands in the East Kimberley region of northern Australia, in relation to which various 
questions concerning the content of the native title interest, the nature of extinguishment 
and the effect of particular government dealings were taken to the High Court.  More 
important for present purposes and for issues of proof was the Yorta Yorta decision.51  
This case produced some important shifts in conceptual emphasis in the High Court’s 
development of the Australian native title doctrine.   
 
The Yorta Yorta claim covered land and waters in the early-settled and now intensively 
used Murray River area, an area that joins New South Wales and Victoria in south-
                                                          
47  The text of these provisions was unchanged by the substantial 1998 amendments (mentioned above) - although 
there were additions to the later sub-sections of s 223 which are not relevant for present purposes.  
48  Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1; Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96; Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 
351; and see also Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113. 
49  For close examination, see Simon Young, The Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change (Federation 
Press, NSW, 2008), Part IV. 
50  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1. 
51  Members of Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422. 
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eastern Australia.  Accordingly, the claim squarely raised the unresolved question: what 
was the impact, for native title purposes, of prolonged western disruption of and 
influence upon an Indigenous community?52 
    
The trial judge in Yorta Yorta, Olney J,53 attempted to identify the land-related 
‘traditional laws and customs’ of the original community.54  He then identified a period 
(beginning in the mid-1860s) in respect of which he said there was insufficient evidence 
of continued observance of traditional lifestyle, recognition and protection of territories, 
or acknowledgement and observance of the relevant traditional laws and customs.  His 
Honour cited evidence of pastoral expansion in the area, dislocation and reduction of 
the Indigenous population,55 and an 1881 Aboriginal ‘petition’ to the Governor for a 
grant of land which pointed to the ‘precariousness’ of their means of subsistence and 
their desire for ‘settling down to more orderly habits of industry’.56  Olney J considered 
it clear that by 1881 the claimant group’s ancestors were ‘no longer in possession’ of 
their lands and had ceased to observe the traditional laws and customs which could 
have provided a basis for the present claim.  He added that dispossession had continued 
through to the present57 and said that ‘no group or individual has been shown to occupy 
any part of the land in the sense that the original inhabitants can be said to have 
occupied it…’.58   
  
Ultimately, Olney J rejected the claim in the following terms: 
The evidence does not support a finding that the descendants of the original inhabitants of the 
claimed land have occupied the land in the relevant sense since 1788 nor that they have continued to 
observe and acknowledge, throughout that period, the traditional laws and customs in relation to 
land of their forebears. The facts in this case lead inevitably to the conclusion that before the end of 
the 19th century the ancestors through whom the claimants claim title had ceased to occupy their 
traditional lands in accordance with their traditional laws and customs. The tide of history has 
indeed washed away any real acknowledgement of their traditional laws and any real observance of 
their traditional customs. The foundation of the claim to native title in relation to the land previously 
occupied by those ancestors having disappeared, the native title rights and interests previously 
enjoyed are not capable of revival. 59 
 
This conclusion as to the circumstances in the 19th century was obviously enough to 
determine the matter. However, Olney J also commented on the evidence before him 
relating to the contemporary practices of the claimant community, including their 
attempts at preservation of mounds, middens and scar trees (the visible signs of earlier 
Aboriginal use of the area), the contemporary conservation of food resources, the re-
burial of returned remains, and involvement in timber and water conservation activities.  
He considered these to be non-traditional, or at best revivalist, rather than ‘traditional’.60 
 
                                                          
52  The Yorta Yorta community had in many respects been more dramatically affected by the history of white 
settlement than previous claimants that had come before the High Court.  See in this context Members of Yorta Yorta 
Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [14]-[15]. 
53  See Members of Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [1998] FCA 1606.  See further analysis in Simon Young, 
The Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change (Federation Press, NSW, 2008). 
54  He relied particularly upon the writings of an early squatter who had resided in the area in the 1840s: see 
particularly [1998] FCA 1606 at [105]-[117]. 
55  At [118], and see also at [37]-[49]. 
56  See particularly at [119]-[121].  For a broad examination of judges’ use of ‘history’ in the native title context, see 
Alexander Reilly ‘How Mabo Helps us Forget’ (2006) 16 Macquarie Law Journal 25 (e.g. at 27). 
57  It was noted in this context that although many of the claimant group resided within the claim area, many did not 
(at [121]).  See also, as to the presence of claimants in the area, Black CJ in Yorta Yorta (2001, FFCt) at 267. 
58  [1998] FCA 1606 at [121]. 
59  At [129]. 
60  At [122]-[125]. 
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In the first appeal by the Yorta Yorta people, a majority of the Full Federal Court 
identified possible errors in Olney J’s approach, particularly as to the degree of 
correlation needed between past and present ‘laws and customs’ and whether present 
occupation ‘in the sense’ of the original occupation was necessary.61  However, their 
Honours felt that unless it was successfully challenged, Olney J’s central finding (i.e., 
that the appellants’ ancestors had at some point ceased any real acknowledgement and 
observance of traditional laws and customs and ceased to exist as a traditional 
Indigenous community) was fatal to the claim.62  In the Full Court majority’s view, the 
trial findings indicated that ‘the continuity of community acknowledgement and obser-
vance of laws and customs providing a connection with the claimed lands and waters 
necessary to establish native title, whether or not such laws and customs had evolved 
and changed over time, had not been demonstrated’.63  It was held that there was ‘more 
than adequate evidence’ to support the finding that there was a period during which the 
relevant community lost its character as a traditional community.64 
 
When the matter proceeded to the High Court,65 Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ in 
their leading judgment66 pursued a new emphasis on the idea that there had been a 
specific ‘intersection’ of traditional laws and customs and the common law.  The source 
of native title rights and interests, it was said, was a ‘normative’ Aboriginal ‘system’,67  
which was unable to validly create new rights, duties or interests after the settlers’ 
acquisition of sovereignty.68  Accordingly, the only native rights or interests which will 
be recognised after sovereignty are those that find their origin in pre-sovereignty law 
and custom.69  Section 223(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), it was said, should be 
read in this light:70 the term ‘traditional’ in s 223(1)(a) and (b) refers not only to 
generational transmission but also conveys an understanding of the age of the ‘tradi-
tions’ - only the normative rules of pre-sovereignty Indigenous societies are ‘traditional’ 
laws and customs.71   
 
Most importantly for present purposes, their Honours proceeded to identify a 
requirement (partly based on the wording of s 223(1)) that the normative system under 
which the rights and interests are possessed (i.e. the traditional laws and customs) must 
be a system that has had a ‘continuous existence and vitality’ since sovereignty.72  They 
explained that otherwise the rights and interests owing their existence to the system will 
have ceased to exist, and any revived adherence to the former system will not 
                                                          
61  Members of Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2001) 110 FCR 244 per Branson and Katz JJ. 
62  At 291-2.  Compare the submissions of the respondents, discussed in the judgment of Black CJ at 249. 
63  At 292. 
64  At 293. Beyond the evidence already mentioned above, it was noted that members of the community had 
themselves conceded a loss (at least for a period) of traditional laws, customs and culture and a discontinuity of 
community; and that anthropological evidence led on behalf of the States involved had indicated that the 
traditional laws and customs had substantially vanished (at 293-4). 
65  Members of Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422.  See the further analysis in Simon Young, 
The Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change (Federation Press, NSW, 2008).   
66  McHugh and Callinan JJ delivered separate judgments (concurring in the result); Gaudron and Kirby JJ jointly 
dissented. 
67  At [37]-[42], [46]-[47]. 
68  At [43]. 
69  At [44], cf. [55]. 
70  At [45]. 
71  At [46], see also [79], [86]. Cf. Callinan J at [191]. 
72  At [47]. For a detailed analysis of some of the possible technical implications of this approach (particularly for claim 
formulation), see Daniel Lavery, ‘A Greater Sense of Tradition: The Implications of the Normative System 
Principles in Yorta Yorta for Native Title Determination Applications’ (2003) 10 Murdoch University Electronic Journal 
of Law. 
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‘reconstitute’ the traditional laws and customs out of which rights and interests must 
‘spring’.73  Their Honours emphasised in this context the close connection between ‘laws 
and customs’ and the ‘society’ that they ‘arise out of’,74 noting that: 
… if the society out of which the body of laws and customs arises ceases to exist as a group which 
acknowledges and observes [them]…, those laws and customs cease to have continued existence and 
vitality.  Their content may be known but if there is no society which acknowledges and observes 
them, it ceases to be useful, even meaningful, to speak of them as a body of laws and customs 
acknowledged and observed, or productive of existing rights or interests…75 
 
As to the possibility of revival, their Honours added:76  
When the society whose laws or customs existed at sovereignty ceases to exist, the rights and 
interests in land to which these laws and customs gave rise, cease to exist. If the content of the former 
laws and customs is later adopted by some new society, those laws and customs will then owe their 
new life to that other, later, society and they are the laws acknowledged by, and customs observed 
by, that later society… The rights and interests in land to which the re-adopted laws and customs give 
rise are rights and interests which are not rooted in pre-sovereignty traditional law and custom but 
in the laws and customs of the new society. 77 
  
The High Court’s intricate and in some respects unsatisfying reasoning here added new 
complexity to an already difficult area.78  And ultimately little new guidance was offered 
on the difficult questions raised earlier in this article.  How close and specific is the 
examination of ‘tradition’?  How much and what type of change and interruption is 
accommodated?  Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ acknowledged the particular 
problems of proof that arose where current laws and customs had been adapted in 
response to European impact, and they noted in this respect that difficult questions of 
fact and degree may emerge in assessing the significance of change or adaptation.  But 
they said no ‘bright line test’ could be offered.79  Ultimately their Honours suggested 
that ‘some’ change and adaptation in traditional law and custom, or ‘some’ interruption 
in the enjoyment or exercise of rights and interests, will ‘not necessarily be fatal’.80  Yet 
their final explanation was, predictably by this point, brief and circular.  On the question 
of change or adaptation: 
The relevant criterion to be applied in deciding the significance of change to, or adaptation of, 
traditional law or custom is readily stated (though its application to particular facts may well be 
                                                          
73  At [47], cf. at [51], [54], [87].  Note that their Honours attached questions about continuity of acknowledgement and 
observance of traditional law and custom to the terms of para (a) of s 223(1), criticising the lower Full Federal Court 
majority’s attempt to locate such questions in para (c) of that section. 
74  At [49], cf. at [55].  Tthe Full Federal Court below had itself spoken of a continuity of identifiable community 
requirement (in addition to the more usual emphasis upon the survival of ‘traditional laws and customs’ and 
‘connection’): see e.g. Members of Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2001) 110 FCR 244 at 275.  (Note 
however that Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ in the High Court turned the attention for these purposes from 
para (c) of ss 223(1) to para (a) of that provision: at [12].) 
75  At [50], cf. [89]. 
76  At [53], cf. at [87], [89]. Cf. also in this regard Gale v Minister for Land & Water Conservation for the State of New South 
Wales [2004] FCA 374 (esp. at [44], [117], [119]). 
77  Their Honours also offered a more theoretical explanation of the point: “In so far as it is useful to analyse the 
problem in the jurisprudential terms of the legal positivist, the relevant rule of recognition of a traditional law or 
custom is a rule of recognition found in the social structures of the relevant Indigenous society as those structures 
existed at sovereignty. It is not some later created rule of recognition rooted in the social structures of a society, 
even an Indigenous society, if those structures were structures newly created after, or even because of, the change 
in sovereignty. So much necessarily follows as a consequence of the assertion of sovereignty and it finds reflection 
in the definition of native title and its reference to possession of rights and interests under traditional law and 
custom”: at [54].  Cf. at [88].  
78  For a more detailed critique, see e.g. Simon Young, The Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change 
(Federation Press, NSW, 2008) at 324ff.  
79  At [82]. 
80  At [83]. 
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difficult). The key question is whether the law and custom can still be seen to be traditional law and 
traditional custom. Is the change or adaptation of such a kind that it can no longer be said that the 
rights or interests asserted are possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged and the 
traditional customs observed by the relevant peoples when that expression is understood in the 
sense earlier identified? 81  
  
The issue of ‘interruption’, which was the critical issue in the scenario before the court, 
was thought to be more difficult.  Significantly, their Honours did note that evidence of 
the non-exercise of rights and interests did not necessarily answer the relevant statutory 
questions – which referred to ‘possession’ of rights and interests (not their ‘exercise’) and 
to the existence of a ‘connection’ to the land or waters.82  However, their Honours then 
returned to the notion that the rights and interests asserted must be possessed under 
traditional laws and customs, and that the connection must be one by their traditional 
laws and customs.83  Ultimately they settled on the proposition that for the laws and 
customs observed now to be properly described as ‘traditional,’ their acknowledgement 
and observance must have continued ‘substantially uninterrupted’ since sovereignty.84  
Otherwise, the judges explained with reference to their earlier reasoning, they would not 
be transmitted laws and customs regulating the rights and interests of succeeding 
generations of the society, but rather would be laws and customs originating in the 
common acceptance or agreement of a new society that it would adopt laws and 
customs similar or identical to those of an earlier, different society.85 
 
When Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ finally returned in conclusion to the findings 
of the trial judge, their Honours explained them (and dispensed with the appeal) in the 
following terms: 
These findings were findings about interruption in observance of traditional law and custom not 
about the content of or changes in that law or custom. They were findings rejecting one of the key 
elements of the case which the claimants sought to make at trial, namely, that they continued to 
observe laws and customs which they, and their ancestors, had continuously observed since 
sovereignty. More fundamentally than that, they were findings that the society which had once 
observed traditional laws and customs had ceased to do so and, by ceasing to do so, no longer 
constituted the society out of which the traditional laws and customs sprang.86 
  
In these final conclusions the judges distanced themselves from the ‘difficult’ questions 
of change, and still did not state exactly what it is that must remain uninterrupted 
(although this was no doubt partly a product of the apparent understanding that the 
discontinuity here was complete).87  The general view is that the Yorta Yorta decision 
pulled the Australian doctrine more deliberately towards a strict approach to proof – an 
                                                          
81  At [83]. The ‘sense earlier identified’ apparently refers to the earlier explanation (at [46]-[47]) that ‘traditional’ here 
means not only generationally transmitted, but also originating pre-sovereignty and (in conjunction with the terms 
‘acknowledged’ and ‘observed’) of continuous existence.  See also at [79].  And cf. another earlier (similarly 
awkward) explanation: “[I]t will be necessary to inquire about the relationship between the laws and customs now 
acknowledged and observed, and those that were acknowledged and observed before sovereignty, and to do so by 
considering whether the laws and customs can be said to be the laws and customs of the society whose laws and 
customs are properly described as traditional laws and customs”: at [56]. 
82  At [84]. Their Honours retained some of the independent emphasis on maintenance of ‘connection’ that had been 
seen in the High Court decision in Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1 – e.g. here at [84] and cf. at [85] (where 
they refer to the relevance of both continuity of ‘possession’ and continuity of ‘connection’).  The question of 
whether such a dual inquiry is appropriate is discussed further below in the context of the Western Australian 
developments.  
83  At [86]. 
84  Compare Callinan J at [195]. 
85  At [87].  Cf. the explanation at [88]. 
86  (2002) 214 CLR 422 at [95]-[96]. See also McHugh J at [138] (in a short judgment, his Honour apparently also 
considered these findings to be determinative). 
87  In addition to the High Court comments here, see the discussion above of the findings and opinions of the lower 
courts. 
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exacting and quite specific ‘tradition’-focus arguably being implicit in the methodology 
and terminology employed, particularly in the leading judgment of Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ.  However, in practical terms, there had been little substantive 
progress.   
 
The Yorta Yorta decision (together with the accompanying decision in Ward) has failed to 
produce clarity and consistency in the succeeding lower court cases.  Some of these 
subsequent cases have embraced the new emphasis and apparent strictness of the High 
Court precedent,88 on occasion even finding additional knots in the doctrine.89  Other 
decisions have found some flexibility in the abstractly reasoned and uncertain standards 
laid down above.90  As regards the Western Australian Noongar claim, the trial 
decision91 lay at the liberal end of the spectrum - but the appeal decision of April 200892 
scrambled some way back.  
 
 
Justice Wilcox in Bennell: Finding Space in the Strict Methodology 
 
As noted at the outset of this article, the controversial trial decision in Bennell v Western 
Australia93 concerned one distinct portion of a broader ‘single Noongar application’ 
which in its entirety covered some 186 000 square kilometres of land and adjoining 
waters in the southern part of Western Australia.  The separated smaller portion, 
brought on for advanced consideration in conjunction with smaller overlapping claims 
in that area (‘the Bodney claims’94), included the Perth region – Perth being the capital 
city of Western Australia.  The question of proof was specifically at issue here: whether 
the Noongar claimants had been and remained a ‘community’ (or ‘society’) for native 
title purposes, had sufficiently continued to acknowledge and observe traditional laws 
and customs, and had maintained a sufficient traditional connection with the relevant 
area.   
 
Justice Wilcox at first instance upheld the Noongar claim to this area, except in respect of 
the off-shore and islands.  His Honour found that subject to questions of 
extinguishment, native title rights and interests in the relevant area were held by a single 
Noongar society, and concluded en route that the contemporary community 
acknowledged and observed laws and customs that were a recognisable adaptation of 
pre-settlement laws and customs.95  The Full Federal Court in Bodney v Bennell96 set aside 
Wilcox J’s decision and returned the matter for reconsideration.  The litigation was 
ultimately therefore little more than an expensive distraction from the prospect of 
meaningful negotiated advances in Western Australia.  The experience of this claim in 
                                                          
88  See e.g. Daniel v Western Australia [2003] FCA 666; Risk v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404. 
89  Perhaps most notably, consider the apparent elevation of the Yorta Yorta decision’s brief reference to generational 
transmission (of laws and customs) to the status of an independent, prescriptive requirement: Risk v Northern 
Territory [2006] FCA 404 at [673], [677], [678], [700]ff – and particularly [723]ff, [821]-[825], [828], [830]-[831] 
(although cf. [727]).  An appeal court rejected a challenge to this aspect of trial judge’s reasoning: Risk v Northern 
Territory [2007] FCAFC 46 at [105]ff. 
90  See e.g. Neowarra v Western Australia (2003) 205 ALR 145; Rubibi Community v Western Australia (No 5) [2005] FCA 
1025 (Rubibi (No 5); De Rose v South Australia [2003] FCAFC 286; Lardil Peoples v Queensland [2004] FCA 298. 
91  Bennell v Western Australia [2006] FCA 1243. 
92  Bodney v Bennell [2008] FCAFC 63. 
93 [2006] FCA 1243. 
94  The Bodney claims relating to this smaller area were dismissed at first instance, and the relevant appeals were also 
dismissed.  The focus in this article is the main group claim. 
95  See in broad terms [2006] FCA 1243, initial summary statement.  
96  [2008] FCAFC 63. 
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the courts highlights the worrying confusion that still attends this centrally important 
Australian legal doctrine. 
 
Justice Wilcox in the trial decision accepted the basic framework of the more exacting 
approach to proof (as re-conceptualised by Yorta Yorta) and its microscoped inquiry into 
cultural continuity.97  Interestingly, his Honour particularly focused on the Yorta Yorta-
bred survival of ‘society’ component of the inquiry.98  However, in the face of 
considerable community change in the relevant area (and the loss of many traditional 
practices)99 Wilcox J tempered the strict approach to proof in a variety of ways:100 
 he approached the notion of ‘society’ with some considered flexibility and 
caution;101 
 he expressly acknowledged the necessity of (and accommodated) community 
change in a variety of contexts;102 
 he expressly accommodated some difference and dissent within the claim group, 
i.e., difference in individual practices and beliefs, some disregard of the ‘rules’, 
and even some rejection of the ‘society’;103 
 he apparently distinguished the inquiry into continuation of a ‘society’ from a 
general search for unchanged laws and customs,104 indicating at various points 
that what was required was continued acknowledgement of ‘some’ traditional 
laws and customs;105 
 he emphasised a ‘communal/inter se’ distinction in dealing with the 
community’s laws and customs,106 with the implication that his microscoped 
inquiry into inter se rules was not a central concern in assessing the survival of 
the native title interest, but rather just one tool in applying the survival of 
‘society’ and existence of ‘normative system’ requirements;107 and 
                                                          
97  For discussion of a broader, fundamentally alternative view see Simon Young, The Trouble with Tradition: Native Title 
and Cultural Change (Federation Press, NSW, 2008).   
98 See particularly the comments at [601], [759].  
99 See particularly at [83], [599], [791] and [806].  Note however that Wilcox J distinguished the Yorta Yorta 
circumstances – on the basis that here no ‘cataclysmic event’ had happened that ‘totally removed’ the community 
from their country: at [599]. 
100  See Simon Young, The Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change (Federation Press, NSW, 2008), p 417. 
101  Note in particular Wilcox J’s acknowledgement that the society may be defined differently for different purposes 
(the relevant society here being that whose laws and customs governed the rights and interests in question) (at 
[424]-425]); that members of the society need not necessarily know each other and live together (at [437]); and that 
the ‘society’ itself may not be the actual native title holding group: e.g. at [77]-[78] (see further discussion of this 
point below). 
102 See for example [773]ff and [785] (inter se rules); at [729] and [787] (permission methods); at [758] (funeral 
practices); and at [784]ff (movement).  See also in this regard Neowarra v Western Australia (2003) 205 ALR 145 at 
[285], [310], [337]-[339], [340]-[341], [764]; Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777 e.g. at [743]ff, [866], [1050]; 
Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia (No 9) [2007] FCA 31 at [332]; Rubibi Community 
v Western Australia (No 5) [2005] FCA 1025 e.g. at [25], [90], [109], [122], [131], [136], [368]; Jango v Northern Territory 
[2006] FCA 318 at [504]; and Griffiths v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 903 at [501], [638]ff. 
103 See e.g. [601], [753]ff, [779], [787].  See also [764]ff (flexibility in inter se rules permitted) and [779]ff (lack of clear 
articulation of rules accommodated).  Cf. Neowarra v Western Australia (2003) 205 ALR 145 at [176]-[177], [184], [191], 
[243], [260], [269], [271] – and the related points at [210], [222], [228], [249], [260], [310], [339], [344]-[346].  See also in 
this regard Jango v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 318 e.g. at [364] (but cf. [405]ff, [449]); Risk v Northern Territory 
[2006] FCA 404 at [624] (but cf. [793]); Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia (No 9) 
[2007] FCA 31 at [100] (but cf. [110], [956]ff). 
104 His Honour considered that the relevance of changes in laws and customs to an inquiry into continuity of society 
depended upon factors such as the importance of the relevant laws and customs and whether the change was 
externally induced: see [776].  
105 See e.g. at [791]. Cf. Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia (No 9) [2007] FCA 31 at 
[962]ff. 
106 See particularly at [61]ff, [78], [794]-[795].  See the further discussion of the communal/inter se distinction below. 
107 See particularly at [601], [764]ff. 
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 upon turning to the actual survival of native title interests, he clearly adopted a 
compartmental approach to proof - in essence requiring only continuity in the 
law and custom underpinning the surviving native title rights.108 
 
It is important to mention at this juncture, when assessing Wilcox J’s apparent liberality 
in applying the relevant principles, that this was a claim (and a case) that cast no doubt 
upon the effects of the many prior government grants and actions that had 
comprehensively extinguished native title over much of the area in issue.  The lands and 
waters subject to such extinguishment were expressly excluded from the claim – and 
accordingly all freehold and much leasehold land was omitted from the application.  To 
put it in the terms of the popular but clearly erroneous response to native title claims in 
Australia, no one’s backyard was at stake.   
 
 
The Full Court in Bennell: Error Found on (at least) Two Counts 
 
When the Noongar claim proceeded on appeal in Bodney v Bennell,109 the Full Federal 
Court (comprised of Finn, Sundberg and Mansfield JJ) pulled the foundations from 
beneath Wilcox J’s findings.  The appeal court was prepared to assume, without 
deciding, that Wilcox J’s initial conclusion that there existed a single Noongar society 
(occupying the southwest) at settlement was correct.110  However, their Honours 
proceeded to comment on a number of components of his Honour’s approach, finding 
specific error in two respects.  It was held that Wilcox J had failed to properly address 
two matters to which the relevant provisions of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)111 (as 
interpreted in the High Court decisions) drew attention.   
 
First, it was concluded that Wilcox J had failed to properly assess whether there had 
been continuous acknowledgement and observance of the traditional laws and customs 
by the Noongar society from sovereignty until recent times.  It was suggested that 
Wilcox J had conducted an inquiry into continuity of society largely divorced from 
inquiry into continuity of the pre-sovereignty normative system, an approach that they 
said ‘may mask unacceptable change with the consequence that the current rights and 
interests are no longer those that existed at sovereignty, and thus not traditional’.112  
There appeared to be several sub-parts to this criticism of the primary judge’s approach.  
It was suggested at various points that: 
 in significant contexts Wilcox J had paid insufficient attention to whether each 
generation of the society continued to observe the relevant laws and customs from 
sovereignty to the present;113 
 in important instances Wilcox J had failed to clearly consider whether post-
sovereignty phenomena (such as the ‘boodja’ – the area accessible to a particular 
individual) were acceptable adaptations of pre-sovereignty ones;114 and 
 Wilcox J erroneously relied upon the reasons for particular change (namely 
specific western interference) in mitigation of that change - the Full Court said 
this was impermissible under the Yorta Yorta precedent.115    
                                                          
108 See particularly at [800].  
109  [2008] FCAFC 63. 
110 At [43].   
111  See s 223. 
112  [2008] FCAFC 63 at [74]. 
113  At  [73], [77].  Note also in this respect the Full Court’s criticism of Wilcox J’s disregard of expert evidence relating 
to the period between sovereignty and the present: esp at [95]. 
114  At  [79]-[80], [82], [83].  
115  At  [81], [82], [96]ff. 
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Apart from the question as to the relevance of the reasons for change, upon which 
opinion is clearly divided in the recent Australian jurisprudence,116 it appears that the 
difference between the primary judge and the appeal court may have been more one of 
degree than of framework.  It is not clear that Wilcox J did adopt the truncated ‘society’-
only version of the inquiry (see the explanation of his methodology above).  And the 
charge of inattention to generational continuity and the acceptability of adaptation was 
perhaps really just a discomfort with Wilcox J’s evidential inferences and deliberate 
receptivity to specific change.    
 
Digging beneath the Yorta Yorta–bred abstractions of ‘society’ and ‘system’, the true 
difficulty here would seem to lie in the intractably problematic nature of the assessment 
of ‘change’, an exercise which (as noted above) has tormented the Australian native title 
jurisprudence from its earliest days.117  The Full Court in this case acknowledged at 
various points that some change to traditional laws and customs is not fatal, and added 
at one point (despite ambiguity on this in the High Court decisions) that even change to 
the native title rights and interests themselves can in some instances be permissible (at 
least where no greater burden is imposed on the sovereign title).118  However, the 
assessment required here is an extraordinarily difficult one – legally, morally and 
evidentially.   
 
The difficult questions attending the courts’ struggle with this aspect of the native title 
doctrine run deep.  How much and what type of change and interruption can be 
accommodated?  Can change really be legally and objectively tracked?  And what 
evidential inferences should be drawn?  Can organic community change ever logically 
be disallowable?  More importantly, the courts are not in most cases working in a 
context of moderate and voluntary change, but rather in a context of prolonged, 
significant and unavoidable western-induced adaptation – i.e., adaptation absolutely 
necessitated by the changing availability of territory and resources, and by enormous 
disruption of social structures and culture.  The scope for uncertainty and disagreement 
is exacerbated by the irony of this legal exercise, which rests upon an assessment not of 
Aboriginal history but of western impact119 and entails a consequent legal distribution of 
rights that by any moral standard would seem to be unjustly doubly-punitive for the 
most disrupted Indigenous communities. 
  
Much of the legal, moral and evidential difficulty here would seem to be avoidable via a 
‘de-particularisation’ (or de-microscoping) of the Australian methodology.  As the legal 
lens recedes, specific cultural change becomes less visible and less relevant.  In terms of 
proof, this would mean that the legal prerequisites for the establishment of subsisting 
native title can be anchored in broader notions of community survival and non-
abandonment.  Perhaps this is what Wilcox J was trying to achieve within the 
constraints of the precedents before him.   
 
                                                          
116 In apparent support of Wilcox J’s approach, see e.g. Neowarra v Western Australia (2003) 205 ALR 145 at [249], [319], 
[321]-[322], [764], and particularly at [309]-[310], [373]-[374] (account taken of the impracticability of enforcing 
permission rules); cf. also at [350], [353] (in the context of ‘connection’). See also Rubibi Community v Western 
Australia (No 5) [2005] FCA 1025 at [96], [147], [183], [241]; Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western 
Australia (No 9) [2007] FCA 31 at [967]. As to the notion of ‘practicability’ more generally, see the judgment of 
Brennan J in the original decision in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
117  For a detailed analysis, see Simon Young, The Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change (Federation 
Press, NSW, 2008) esp pp 368ff. 
118  [2008] FCAFC 63 at [74], [119]-[120].  Cf. Rubibi Community v Western Australia (No 5) [2005] FCA 1025 at [266]. 
119  See Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483 per Lee J at 514; cf. Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316 per 
Beaumont and von Doussa JJ at 353. 
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The Full Court in the Bodney v Bennell appeal decision, despite its general objection to 
Wilcox J’s flexible approach, does hint at one specific methodological correction that can 
help to de-microscope the Australian methodology and hence mitigate the difficulties of 
assessing change.  As noted above their Honours suggested, in responding to argument 
about whether ‘new’ rights can develop post-sovereignty, that perhaps the ‘true 
position’ is that ‘what cannot be created after sovereignty are rights that impose a 
greater burden on the Crown’s radical title’.120  Their Honours’ accompanying examples, 
combined with their comments elsewhere,121 indicate that they are here acknowledging 
(although less explicitly122 and more cautiously123 than the primary judge) a critical but 
often-neglected distinction: the distinction between the communal (or external) native 
title interest and the specific inter se (or internal) distribution of that interest within the 
community.  The latter is logically of little concern to the western legal system, and 
hence cultural continuity in that regard should be less important.  Armed with a proper 
recognition of this distinction, which has been pressed by prominent commentators124 
and touched upon but incompletely explored in earlier Australian cases,125 the 
Australian courts might begin to approach the evidence in these difficult cases with 
structured circumspection rather than unguided pedantry.  
 
An equally important methodological correction, that would further help to de-
microscope the Australian methodology, would be a clear differentiation of native ‘title’ 
from native ‘rights’.  This distinction has been central to the contemporary Canadian 
jurisprudence,126 is implicit in the New Zealand cases,127 and is visible in related contexts 
in the US.128  It is certainly not a complete answer to all of the difficulties in the 
Australian law, as Canadian experience has demonstrated.129  Yet the distinction is not 
unnecessary duplication, as suggested by some Australian observers of the Canadian 
developments.  For Australia, a country whose native title doctrine has failed to proceed 
coherently beyond specific ‘rights’, a clear adoption of the ‘rights’ vs. ‘title’ distinction 
would be an important preliminary conceptual clarification.  Apart from the 
distinction’s obvious importance as regards the content of native title, it would help with 
the difficulties of proof addressed in this article - leaving room for the courts to attach 
continuity inquiries (in the case of title claims appropriately framed as such) to broader 
traditional assertions of ownership or custodianship rather than to specific traditional 
practices and principles.  Unfortunately the rights vs. title distinction remains under-
                                                          
120  [2008] FCAFC 63 at [121]. 
121  E.g. at [147], [154]. 
122  Cf. Bennell v Western Australia [2006] FCA 1243 e.g. at [78], [794]-[795],  
123  See [2008] FCAFC 63 at [153]. 
124  See e.g. Noel Pearson, ”The High Court’s Abandonment of “The Time-Honoured Methodology of the Common 
Law” in its Interpretation of Native Title in Mirriuwung Gajerrong and Yorta Yorta” (2003) 7 Newcastle Law Review 
1; Noel Pearson, ”Land is Susceptible of Ownership” in Peter Cane (ed), Centenary Essays for the High Court of 
Australia (Butterworths, Sydney, 2004). 
125  See e.g. Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483 at 508, 514, 529, 542; Commonwealth v Yarmirr (1999) 101 FCR 
171 at 248-9; Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777 at [954], [955], [983], [1053], [1069]; Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 
CLR 351 at 383-4.  
126  See e.g. R v Sparrow (1990) 70 DLR (4th) 385; R v Van der Peet (1996) 137 DLR (4th) 289; Delgamuukw v British 
Columbia (1997) 153 DLR (4th) 193. 
127  See Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [1986] 1 NZLR 680; McRitchie v Taranaki Fish and Game Council [1999] 2 NZLR 
139 per Thomas J; and the more recent decision in Attorney-General v Ngati Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643.  For stronger 
recognition of the rights vs. title distinction in earlier New Zealand jurisprudence, see e.g. Kauwaeranga Judgment 
(Native Land Court, 3 Dec 1870) – published in (1984) 14 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 227; Re The 
Ninety-Mile Beach [1963] NZLR 461; Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General (1912) 32 NZLR 321. 
128  See particularly the US Treaty-reserved rights cases, examined in Simon Young, The Trouble with Tradition: Native 
Title and Cultural Change (Federation Press, NSW, 2008), pp 117ff. 
129  See for example the difficult questions considered in the case of ‘title’ in the recent decision of Tsilhqot’in Nation v 
British Columbia 2007 BCSC 1700; [2008] 1 CNLR 112.  And as regards ‘rights’, see for example R v Sappier; R v Gray 
(2006) 274 DLR (4th) 75. 
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explored in Australia, and indeed was buried somewhat by the tone of discussion in the 
High Court’s Ward decision. 
 
The second major error that the Full Court in Bodney v Bennell identified in the primary 
judge’s reasoning related to the assessment of the claimants’ ‘connection’ pursuant to s 
223(1)(b) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).  It was concluded that Wilcox J had 
erroneously assumed that the establishment of a connection with the larger Noongar 
claim area meant there was necessarily a connection with the smaller separated portion 
(it being a part of the larger area).  The approach of Wilcox J, viewed in the mathematical 
abstract, is unobjectionable.  So again the objection of the Full Court would seem to be 
not so much to framework but to the lack of rigour and specificity in the primary judge’s 
approach, this time in his assessment of the claimants’ connection with the relevant area 
(and indeed the area of the broader claim130).    Their Honours queried, as a sub-issue in 
this context, whether Wilcox J had properly considered whether the native title was in 
fact owned by the community as a whole131 (and indeed whether native title is 
‘ordinarily’ communal as widely thought132), however this was not a matter specifically 
pursued in the appeals.133   
 
The Full Court particularly emphasised in this context that the inquiry into ‘connection’ 
should not be fused or confused with the inquiry into the existence of rights and 
interests under s 223(1)(a), although it was conceded that both are sourced in traditional 
laws and customs and that in some cases the same evidence will be used to identify 
each.134  The judges seemed to draw from this procedural distinction some support for 
their insistence on geographical (and sub-communal) particularity in the connection 
inquiry,135 which framed the most telling criticism of the primary judge on the issue of 
connection: 
 
…if those persons whom the laws and customs connect to a particular part of the claim area have not 
continued to observe without substantial interruption the laws and customs in relation to their 
country, they cannot succeed in a claim for native title rights and interests even if it be shown … that 
other Noongar peoples have continued to acknowledge and observe the traditional laws and customs 
of the Noongar…136 
                                                          
130  See [2008] FCAFC 63 at [170], [181]. 
131  At [153]. 
132  At  [158]. 
133  As to the difficulty of identifying ultimate Aboriginal land holding units (in the face of (e.g.) complex inter-locking 
systems of resource use or entitlement, overlapping or conflicting claims, or the devolution of broad rights and 
responsibilities to sub-groups), see e.g. Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1 at 183; Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 
CLR 351 at 372-3; Gale v Minister for Land and Water Conservation (NSW) [2004] FCA 374 at [51]ff; Lardil Peoples v 
Queensland [2004] FCA 298 at [140]; Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483 per Lee J at 528-9, 533, 541-3. And 
see generally in this context Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316 per Beaumont and von Doussa JJ; De Rose v 
South Australia [2003] FCAFC 286; De Rose v South Australia (No 2) [2005] FCAFC 110; Rubibi Community v Western 
Australia (No 5) [2005] FCA 1025; Rubibi Community v Western Australia (No 6) [2006] FCA 82; Jango v Northern 
Territory [2006] FCA 318; Daniel v Western Australia [2003] FCA 666 (e.g. at [319], [355], [508]); Alyawarr, Kaytetye, 
Warumungu, Wakay Native Title Claim Group v Northern Territory [2004] FCA 472 (esp at 129ff); Northern Territory v 
Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group [2005] FCAFC 135 at [95]ff; Griffiths v Northern 
Territory [2006] FCA 903; Risk v Northern Territory [2007] FCAFC 46; Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People 
v Western Australia (No 9) [2007] FCA 31 esp at [536]ff, [1138] (emphasis upon identifying the level of grouping to 
which the rights and interests directly attach, and correlatively any necessary ‘memberships’); and particularly 
Gumana v Northern Territory [2007] FCAFC 23 at [141]ff; Neowarra v Western Australia (2003) 205 ALR 145 (esp at 
[120], [311], [358], [384]ff).  See also the unusual situation in Worimi v Minister for Lands (NSW) [2006] FCA 1770 
(Worimi (2006, FCt)). For a detailed discussion of these issues, and the underlying debates between ‘collectivist’ and 
‘atomist’ anthropologists, see Daniel Lavery, “A Greater Sense of Tradition: The Implications of the Normative 
System Principles in Yorta Yorta for Native Title Determination Applications” (2003) 10 Murdoch University 
Electronic Journal of Law.   
134  [2008] FCAFC 63 at [165]. 
135  At  [167], [178], [179]. 
136  At  [186]. 
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On one reading, the Full Court is breaking into internal or inter se community matters in 
this conclusion.  The problems of logic in such an approach are betrayed by the reference 
to the fact that in such a situation ‘they’ (the particular persons) cannot succeed in a 
claim for native title – but of course it is not ‘they’ that have claimed, it is the 
community.  The broader difficulties of an inattention to the communal / inter se 
distinction were touched upon above.  These theoretical problems aside, the essence of 
the Full Court’s conclusion appears to be that the primary judge did not properly assess 
whether any communal native title in the hands of the Noongar community truly 
survived in relation to this area.    
 
Whether the primary judge’s supposed digression on the matter of connection was a 
difference in framework or simply a difference in flexibility of application, there are 
clearly conflicting views in the case law as to whether a rigorous independent 
‘connection’ test should be applied on top of the identification of traditionally sourced 
rights and interests.137  The problem here perhaps arises from the fact that beyond the 
possible implications of the structure of s 223(1), it is difficult to understand why it is 
necessary for claimants to establish a connection beyond that inherent in the 
establishment of surviving traditionally sourced rights and interests in the relevant area.  
The risk of an insistence upon independent inquiries is, as apparently accepted by the 
Full Court,138 that the inquiry into cultural continuity drifts off into anthropological 
observations that may really have little relevance to any native title rights and interests - 
in the process no doubt obstructing any attempts to de-particularise the court’s 
examination of the relevant community.  And this approach risks complete disregard 
(because of the ‘tradition’ focus in this context also) of the strength of a community’s 
current connection with an area.  All this necessarily multiplies (without clear 
justification) the Australian doctrinal difficulties, and compounds the institutional 
denigration (again without justification) of contemporary Indigenous priorities and 
initiatives.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The result of the appeal in Bodney v Bennell, as noted earlier, was that the case was 
remitted to the lower court for the matter to be re-examined (possibly with this area 
reunited with the broader Noongar southwest claim).139  As emphasised throughout this 
article, the abrupt fate of this important claim and the dissonance in the reasoning of the 
two decisions, particularly when viewed against the earlier Australian precedents, 
indicate that significant confusion still attends the Australian native title doctrine.  The 
doctrine in its present form is an awkward mix of foundational ambiguity, theoretical 
complexity, moral controversy and practical uncertainty.  The task facing lower court 
judges is therefore a formidable one, and they are perhaps inevitably led in this climate 
to inconsistent and sometimes questionable conclusions. 
 
                                                          
137  In apparent support of a more liberal approach, see De Rose v South Australia [2003] FCAFC 286 particularly at 
[305]ff, and cf. also counsel’s arguments (e.g. at [180]). See also De Rose v South Australia (No 2) [2005] FCAFC 110 at 
[109]ff; Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777 at [1075]-[1079]; Rubibi Community v Western Australia (No 5) [2005] 
FCA 1025 at [376]; Rubibi Community v Western Australia (No 6) [2006] FCA 82 at [95]; Northern Territory v Alyawarr, 
Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group [2005] FCAFC 135 at [88]ff. 
138  [2008] FCAFC 63 at [169].  The Full Court was careful not to return to the redundant proposition that ‘physical 
presence’ is necessary for maintenance of connection, but their Honours did insist on it being demonstrated that the 
claimants have asserted the ‘reality’ of their connection to land or waters, clearly hinting at the potential importance 
of physical presence or at least evidence of attempts to overcome the absence of physical presence (at [171]ff, [178]). 
139  [2008] FCAFC 63 at [211]. 
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On the arguments in this article, many of the problems would dissipate with a concerted 
de-particularisation of the prevailing Australian methodology.  This would entail a 
proper acknowledgement of the potentially comprehensive nature of the native title 
interest,140 and correlatively, a de-microscoping of the approach to cultural continuity.  
The legal, evidential and moral difficulties involved in the assessment of cultural change 
would be greatly reduced if specific cultural change were removed in this manner (in 
appropriate cases) from the purview of the courts.  Questions as to the type and degree 
of change permissible, issues of causation and evidential complexity would fade into a 
broader, simpler, more logical and more principled inquiry into whether the 
community’s traditionally-based assertion of and commitment to its interest, as properly 
defined, had survived.   
 
It has been argued in this article that the Canadian rights vs. title distinction, and the 
anthropologically obvious communal vs. inter se distinction, have the potential to 
significantly assist in this doctrinal clarification.  However, it must also be noted that the 
correction became somewhat harder to achieve following the Ward and Yorta Yorta 
theorising of 2002.  The convolution in the Australian doctrine has threatened to become 
self-reinforcing.  The mindset of strict particularity as regards the core notion of 
‘traditional laws and customs’ can too easily permeate, and therefore be propped up by, 
the newer abstract inquiries into ‘society’ and ‘system’ and a stubbornly retained 
independent ‘connection’ inquiry.  It is hoped that these questionable aspects of the 
Australian thinking do not inhibit broader progress.  
 
Wilcox J’s primary decision in Bennell v Western Australia, an attempt to steer towards a 
more principled approach within the apparent confines of the current confused law, was 
met with considerable public support in Western Australia.  It was in some respects 
legally cavalier - at least when tested against the stricter thinking that has threaded its 
way through much of the Australian jurisprudence.  This was perhaps an attempt by a 
retiring eminent Australian judge to re-sketch the bigger picture in the impossible detail 
of contemporary Australian native title.141  Unfortunately the appeal result illustrates 
that the Noongar claimants and the Australian doctrine are still very much lost in the 
detail.  
 
Stepping back for a moment from this discussion of legal principle, the Noongar 
experience illustrates how conventional litigation can be an expensive and unhelpful 
distraction from meaningful progress on Indigenous rights.  The costs and delays of a 
native title system that frequently draws parties to litigation weigh heavily on all 
stakeholders in Australia.  Moreover, in a clinical adversarial context, the questions are 
asked and answered in unnatural isolation from the social, historical and political 
context that makes them so vitally important.  The multifarious impacts of the ‘tide of 
history’ on Indigenous Australians are not easily understood and assessed, let alone 
ameliorated, from the vantage point of dry, distant and exacting legal principle.    
 
     
 
                                                          
140  Cf. the possible conceptual progress made in Griffiths v Northern Territory [2007] FCAFC 178. 
141  Cf. the analogy in Sky Mykyta, “Losing Sight of the Big Picture” (2005) 36 Ottawa Law Review 93. 
